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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
\7 
V • 
WILLIAM DONALD CARTER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20040637-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). Appellant William Donald Carter was convicted of reckless endangerment under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (2003). Due to a previous conviction for domestic violence, 
the charge for endangerment was enhanced to a third degree felony offense. The 
judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the state presented sufficient evidence 
to establish reckless endangerment under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (2003). 
Standard of Review: A sufficiency issue is reviewed as follows: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We will reverse 
a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous 
cases). An observation made by this court in Petree bears repeating here: 
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this 
Court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between 
the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to 
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumwav. 2002 UT 124, Tfl5, 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 131:182-185. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the issue here, and set forth in 
Addendum B, hereto: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-103(3) and 76-5-112 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On January 29, 2003, the state charged Carter with reckless endangerment, a third 
degree felony offense. (R. 2-3.) On June 10, 2003, the court conducted a preliminary 
hearing in the matter and bound Carter over on the charge. (R. 18-19.) On April 27, 
2004, the trial court conducted a jury trial. (See R. 131.) The jury convicted Carter as 
charged. (R. 68.) On July 12, 2004, the trial court entered Judgment against Carter. 
The court ordered a suspended prison term and sentenced Carter to 120 days in the 
county jail followed by probation. (R. 109-111.) On August 2, 2004, Carter filed a 
notice of appeal. (R. 112.) He is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence presented at trial reflected the following: On November 30, 2002, 
Carter and Annie Baker lived together in the area of 2376 South 1440 West in Salt Lake 
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City. (R. 131:127-28.) Baker worked at Albertson's. (Id.) Because they had one car 
that worked, Baker relied on Carter for a ride to Albertson's. She had to report to work 
at 1:15 in the afternoon. She woke Carter that afternoon in sufficient time to drive her 
there. (R. 131:129-30, 187.) Carter was angry. He and Baker argued. (R. 131:130-131, 
150.) They continued to argue as Carter drove Baker north on Redwood Road to 
Albertson's. (See R. 131:131.) 
Carter was having problems with the truck. (R. 131:131-32, 150-51.) The engine 
idled high. (R. 131:131.) Carter pulled the truck off the road into a parking lot, and 
"kinda pushed" Baker as he told her to get out. (R. 131:132.) Baker began to walk 
along the side of the road to work. Carter pulled up behind Baker and told her to get back 
in the truck. (R. 131:133, 134.) He also called her names. (R. 131:135.) She ignored 
him and refused to get into the truck because she "was afraid of what might happen." (R. 
131:135-36.) This went on for several blocks. (R. 131:136.) 
Baker testified that Carter pulled up right behind her, beside her, and stopped in 
the gravel shoulder of the road so that she was directly in front of the passenger 
headlight. (R. 131:137.) He did that two or three times. (R. 131:139,145.) He also 
pulled up beside her and yelled at her. (See R. 131:145.) He screamed at her through the 
passenger's side window; he wanted her to get back into the truck. (R. 131:139-40.) 
Although Baker tried to ignore Carter, she could hear the truck engine rev when 
he came up behind her. (R. 131:143.) She heard the truck on the gravel shoulder. It was 
"[f]ast enough to where he'd have to slam on his brakes before he hit me." (R. 131:138.) 
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When he used the brakes, she could hear the gravel and dirt flying, and the truck would 
come within 8 to 12 inches of her (R. 131:138); "it would be like just enough to clip me 
ifhe wanted to." (R. 131:137.) 
Baker testified that at some point she was "ducking behind telephone poles and 
stuff like that, because [she] thought he was trying to hit [her]." (R. 131:139.) 
At approximately 13 th South, Carter stopped, got out of the truck, walked to 
Baker, and grabbed her phone from her backpack because she threatened to call the 
police. He pulled her hair as he took the phone. (R. 131:141-42.) 
Carter made a U-turn at approximately 10th South and left the area. (R. 131:143.) 
Baker testified that Carter had made threats in the past to drive into a telephone 
pole and "take [them] both out." (R. 131:144.) On November 30, he threatened that one 
of them "was going to get hurt." (Id.) Before Baker arrived at Albertson's a police 
officer stopped her. (R. 131:146.) Baker was surprised and thought Carter had called 
police. She learned that an anonymous caller had telephoned to report a possible domes-
tic dispute. (R. 131:146, 147-148, 163.) The officer took Baker to work. (R. 131:165.) 
Carter denied the implication that he tried to scare Baker. He testified that he had 
purchased the truck a week earlier for $150. It was a temporary vehicle until he could 
get his Blazer running. (R. 131:188.) The truck ran, but was dilapidated. The driver's 
side door was falling off, and the throttle would stick. (R. 131:188-89.) As Carter drove 
Baker to work, the engine began to rev when he stepped on the clutch; it was as though 
the truck would blow up. (R. 131:189, 196.) Carter pulled off the road, and Baker got 
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out of the truck to walk to work. (R. 131:189.) Carter testified that once he got going 
again, he would have to stop the car by shutting off the engine with the key. (R. 
131:190, 195.) 
Carter testified that he pulled up to Baker, turned off the key, and yelled at her in 
an effort to convince her to get back into the truck. (R. 131: 191-92.) As she continued 
to walk, he would "start [up the truck,] take off and then [he would] hit the brakes and 
stop. And it was all rocky and gravelly there." (R. 131:192.) Carter testified that he did 
not endanger Baker, he was not trying to hit her or scare her, and he did not pull up 
behind her in a threatening way. (R. 131:192-93, 204-06.) He also testified that she did 
not run behind telephone poles. (R. 131: 204-05.) After he pulled up to her three times 
and she did not respond, he turned around and went back home. (R. 131:193.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Carter as charged. (R. 68.) He 
timely appealed. (See R. 106-113.) Carter is not incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the offense of reckless endangerment, the state was required to prove that 
Carter recklessly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily injury. In this case, the state failed to establish criminal recklessness. It failed to 
prove an element of the offense. The conviction must be vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT. 
Carter was convicted of enhanced reckless endangerment under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-112 (2003), a third degree felony offense. He maintains the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support the conviction. 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Smith, 927 
P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id; State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "We view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Smith, 927P.2dat651. 
State v. Gonzales. 2000 UT App 136, ^ [10, 2 P.3d 954: see also State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 
74«T[18. 10 P.3d 346: State v.Leleae. 1999 UT App 368. If 17. 993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "'must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^ [13, 
25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98,1fl4, 989 P.2d 1065). 
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long 
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as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element of the offense, this 
Court will not disturb the jury's verdict. See Boyd, 2001 UT 30,1J14. 
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: "'It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses' So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Id at Tfl6 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)); see also State v. Cravens. 2000 UT App 
344, Tfl8, 15 P.3d 635 (it is the province of the trier of fact to determine which testimony 
to believe and what inferences to draw from the facts); State v. Chanev. 1999 UT App 
309, TJ30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but 
instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the 
verdict'"); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991) (the mere existence of 
conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 
(Utah 1993) ("Credibility is an issue for the trier of fact, in this case the jury. The jury 
necessarily accepts the testimony of certain witnesses and discounts conflicting testimony. 
Moreover, as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury believed 
the evidence supporting the verdict.") (cites omitted). 
Also, it is well settled that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial 
evidence." State v. Lyman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). '"Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded 
as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining 
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.'" IcL (quoting 
State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); see State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 
(Utah 1991). Where circumstantial evidence is presented, this Court must determine 
whether '"the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and 
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 
985 (Utah 1993)); James. 819 P.2d at 789 ("It is well established that intent can be proven 
by circumstantial evidence"). 
Nevertheless, if the verdict "'is based solely on inferences that give rise to only re-
mote or speculative possibilities of guilt," it is not valid. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (citing 
Workman. 852 P.2d at 985); see State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, ^|5, 988 P.2d 
452 (recognizing that reversal is required if the state has failed to establish an element of 
the offense with evidence or inferences). With that in mind, the function of a reviewing 
court is to ensure "that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the 
charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Merila. 966 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting James. 819 
P.2dat784.) 
As set forth below, in this matter the state failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish that Carter acted with criminal recklessness and created a substantial risk of 
death or serious bodily injury to Baker. The conviction must be dismissed. 
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A. THE CRIME OF ENDANGERMENT REQUIRES PROOF OF CRIMINAL 
RECKLESSNESS. 
To establish reckless endangerment, the state must prove the following: "A person 
commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not amounting to a felony 
offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury to another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112(1) (2003). 
Criminal recklessness is defined in Utah law: 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003). It is a particular element of the felony offense at 
issue here. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1), (2)(b) (2003) (stating that a defendant is 
presumed innocent until each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including "the culpable mental state required"). 
Utah courts have addressed the issue of criminal recklessness. It is correct to state 
that criminal recklessness falls between depraved indifference and criminal intent on the 
one hand, and criminal negligence on the other. 
On the spectrum of criminal mental states, depraved indifference is closely related 
to criminal recklessness. State v. Standiford» 769 P.2d 254, 263 (Utah 1988) (recognizing 
historical similarities). Depraved indifference requires the state to prove that defendant 
acted knowingly in creating a grave risk of death, and that he knew the risk of death was 
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grave with a high probability of death, and the conduct evidenced utter callousness and 
indifference toward human life. IcL at 264. Also, depraved indifference "is characterized 
by unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity or acts exhibiting a high degree of wan-
tonness." State v. Bolsinger. 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985) (cite omitted). Criminal 
recklessness requires the state to prove that defendant knew his conduct created a sub-
stantial risk of death, and defendant consciously disregarded that risk. Defendant's disre-
gard must constitute a "gross deviation" from the reasonable standard of care. See 
Standiford, 769 P.2d at 263-64 (stating that the difference between depraved indifference 
and recklessness is that the former requires a higher risk of death than the latter). 
On the other end of the spectrum, criminal negligence requires that a defendant 
"ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" created by his conduct. Also, if 
defendant fails to perceive the risk created by his conduct, and the failure is a "gross 
deviation" from the reasonable standard of care, that constitutes criminal negligence. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (2003). 
Thus, a defendant may be held criminally liable for negligence when the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the defendant should have perceived, but failed to, and "that the risk is of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care." State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146. 1151 (Utah 1991). 
The difference between criminal recklessness and criminal negligence is that for 
recklessness, the defendant actually knew of the risk created by his conduct, while for 
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negligence, he "should have been" aware of the risk, but was not. See Standiford, 769 
P.2d at 267; State v. Howard. 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (ruling that the difference 
between recklessness and criminal negligence is whether defendant "was aware, but 
consciously disregarded a substantial risk" for recklessness; and whether defendant "was 
unaware but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk" for negligence) (emphasis in 
original); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that the 
difference between recklessness and negligence is that defendant was actually aware of 
the risk of death for the former, while he was not, but should have been aware of such 
risk for the latter); State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983); State v. Robinson . 
2003 UT App 1, Tf6 n.2, 63 P.3d 105. 
Thus, the crime of reckless endangerment requires proof that defendant was aware 
of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct 
would cause death or serious bodily injury, and that defendant's actions in disregarding 
that risk constituted "ca gross deviation5 from the standard of care exercised by an ordi-
nary person." Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-112, 76-2-103(3); 
see also State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). To be clear, 
"reckless" as used in its "colloquial sense" will not suffice; "the definition of 'reckless' 
that we are bound to follow-the definition set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) 
(1999)—is narrower." Robinson. 2003 UT App 1, ^ [10 n.3. 
In State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, this Court ruled that the evidence was 
insufficient to support criminal recklessness. There, defendant and the victim were 
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drinking beer and examining defendant's handgun. When the victim activated the slide, 
the defendant took the gun from her, noticed it was jammed, and ejected a bullet from the 
gun. The defendant than put the bullet back into the clip. The victim took the gun again 
and fired it. A bullet hit her just below the left ear. She died. Id_ at f 2. 
In assessing whether defendant acted recklessly, this Court specified that the 
inquiry involves both "objective and subjective elements." IdL at ^ [6 (cite omitted). 
Two subjective elements of the definition are whether the person actually 
perceived the risk that his or her actions presented and whether he or she 
consciously disregarded it. [] See State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) 
(recognizing that whether an actor perceived and disregarded a risk "is purely [a 
question] of subjective intent in the mind of the actor"); State v. Martinez, 2000 
UT App 320, Tfl2 n.5, 14 P.3d 114 ("Liability for criminal recklessness . . . 
requires actual knowledge or awareness and thus turns on the defendant's 
subjective mental state.") (citations omitted), affd, 2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276. 
The magnitude of the risk itself, on the other hand, is an objective matter. See 
Wessendorf, 111 P.2d at 526 ("The statutory language includes application of an 
objective standard, i.e., that 'the risk in both cases must be of such a degree that an 
ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize it.'") (quoting State v. 
Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983)). 
Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, ^ [6; also id at n. 2 ("the determination to be made is whether 
the defendant was subjectively 'aware of but consciously disregarded' the risk his actions 
posed") (cite omitted). This Court found that while defendant contributed to the victim's 
death, the evidence failed to support that he acted with criminal recklessness. Id. at ^ [7. 
In State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court also considered 
the sufficiency of the evidence for recklessness. The facts of that case were as follows. 
In early 1988, authorities were involved in a thirteen-day siege with defendant and his 
family (the Singer-Swapp family) on their property. IdL at 1304. In an effort to end the 
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siege without gunfire, authorities took positions in a structure known as the Bates house 
bordering the Singer ranch. They hoped to isolate and peaceably arrest defendant and 
other family members as they left their own home for chores or made visits to the Bates 
house. Id at 1304-05. The officers' plans involved the use police service dogs to take 
defendant and the Swapp brothers to the ground as they left their home. IcL 
On January 28, 1988, under the cover of darkness officers positioned themselves 
with dogs at the door of the Bates house. As the Swapp brothers left their house for 
chores, the officers released the dogs from the Bates house. Id. 1305. 
Thereafter, "[a] nearly simultaneous series of events ensued. A burst of shots was 
fired from the Singer house. The dogs became confused and failed to key on the 
brothers." Id When one of the Swapp brothers aimed his weapon, an officer shot and 
wounded him in the wrist. During the shooting, a second officer was shot and fell to the 
ground. He was pronounced dead at an area hospital. When the shooting stopped, 
defendant and his family members surrendered to authorities. Officers later searched the 
premises and discovered twenty-three firearms and more than 8,000 rounds of 
ammunition. They also discovered two rifles near the window of defendant's bedroom. 
One of these rifles was identified as the weapon used to shot the felled officer. IcL 
On appeal defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support criminal 
recklessness. Id at 1306. He claimed that he was only shooting at the dogs, and had no 
reason to know that the officers were at the Bates house. Id at 1307. He argued that 
based on the evidence, he "should only have been convicted of negligent homicide." 
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Id. at 1306. This Court was not persuaded. It considered the pattern, direction, rapid 
sequence, timing and measured aim of the shots from defendant's home to support that 
he did not shot at the dogs. IcL at 1308. Also, the defendant acknowledged that the 
initial shots prompting his return fire came from the Bates house, as did the dogs. That 
acknowledgment supported that defendant knew a person was in the Bates house when 
he shot in that direction. 14. The state's evidence further supported that defendant aimed 
shots in the direction of the Jepsen home (beyond the Bates house), where defendant and 
his family had seen officers moving about. Id. at 1308. 
"Only shots fired at an extreme angle to the rear of the Bates property would not 
traverse the plane of the Jepsen property. The jury could have reasonably concluded that 
shots fired even generally towards the Bates house were fired recklessly since they could 
easily reach" the Jepsen property occupied by officers. IcL at 1308. 
This Court found the evidence to be sufficient to support recklessness: 
We confine our review of the evidence to determining whether the evidence was 
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant acted recklessly in shooting 
his rifle and causing the death of [the victim]. Assuming the jury believed the 
evidence suggesting Singer's awareness of persons within his line of fire, as we 
must, we do not find that the evidence of recklessness was "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that Singer acted recklessly. Questions of intent 
are strictly within the province of the jury and the jury was not required to accept 
that Singer was merely plinking at the police service dogs unaware of any risk to 
human life. Accordingly, we hold the evidence of Singer's recklessness to be 
sufficient to support a conviction of manslaughter for the death of [the victim]. 
Id at 1308-09 (citations omitted). 
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Applying the law set forth above, the marshaled evidence here fails to support 
criminal recklessness. The conviction for reckless endangerment must be reversed. 
B. THE MARSHALED FACTS FAIL TO SUPPORT CRIMINAL 
RECKLESSNESS. 
At the close of the state's case in this matter, the defense made a motion to dismiss 
the endangerment charge on the grounds that the state failed to establish the mens rea of 
criminal recklessness. (See R. 131:182-183.) The trial court denied the motion: 
I am going to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss at this time. While the 
standard is higher at this point, I do believe that the State has presented testimony 
through Ms. Baker's testimony that the defendant did pull the car very close to 
her, two - at least two to three times, which is what my notes say that she did, and 
that at the time that he was doing this, he was yelling at her, he was angry, he was 
agitated, were the words that were presented, as well as making threats that one of 
them was going to get hurt. 
And then evidence has also been presented that the phone was taken from her in a 
threatening manner. All of this taken together, I think is sufficient evidence for a 
trier of fact to find that the behavior was more than bad driving, more than even 
just negligent behavior. That, given the fact that we are dealing with a powerful 
tool of a motor vehicle and that the victim was outside of the vehicle, so we're 
talking about a motor vehicle versus a person, that there is certainly a very real 
danger of serious injury or even death in this kind of circumstances. 
And for it to be repeated, as argued by the State and accompanied by threatening 
language and angry behavior, a trier of fact could reasonably find that that grossly 
deviated from the normal - from the norm, and that it was beyond negligent 
behavior and could find that it was reckless pursuant to the legal definition of 
reckless. 
So the motion to dismiss at this time is [] denied. I do find there is sufficient 
testimony to go to the jury and the trier of fact. 
(R. 131:184-185.) The relevant pages containing the argument and the ruling are 
attached hereto as Addendum C. 
Considering the court's ruling and the jury verdict, the marshaled evidence is as 
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follows: Carter and Baker had lived together and dated for 8 months to a year. (R. 
131:128.) On November 30, 2002, they had one car that worked. (R. 131:129.) Baker 
woke Carter in the afternoon to take her to work. (R. 131:129.) Carter was "angry that 
he had to take [Baker] to work and he made it very obvious to [her] that he was not 
happy about taking [her] to work." (R. 131:131.) Carter said things to Baker that were 
emotionally hurtful. (R. 131:131; see also 131:149, 150.) 
On the drive to work, Carter experienced car problems. The engine was revving: 
it idled high. (R. 131:131, 149.) Carter pulled over on Redwood Road just north of 21st 
South, and told Baker to "get the hell out of the car" and he "kinda pushed" her out. (R. 
131:132, 134.) Baker began to walk on the east side of the road to work. (R. 131:133, 
134.) She walked in the gravel shoulder because there were no sidewalks. (R. 131:134.) 
Carter followed her real close in the truck. (R. 131:133.) He was screaming at 
her, calling her obscene names, pulling up behind her and beside her, and telling her to 
get back into the truck, that he would take her to work. (R. 131:133, 134-35, 137, 140.) 
He would pull up so that "the passenger side had like - it wouldn't be directly in front of 
me, but it would be like just enough to clip me if he wanted to." (R. 131:137.) She was 
walking in front of the passenger headlight in front of the truck. (R. 131:137.) 
Carter drove fast enough on the shoulder to where he would have to slam on the 
brakes so as not to hit Baker. The brake action would cause the truck to slide "a little 
bit" because of the gravel and dirt shoulder. (R. 131:138.) The truck would stop 8 to 12 
inches from Baker and rocks and dirt would fly. (R. 131:138.) Baker was afraid. (R. 
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131:138-39.) She testified that Carter came up to her like that at least two to three times. 
(R. 131:139.) Each time Carter put his foot on the gas, Baker could hear the engine rev 
and idle high. (R. 131:143; but see 131:136.) 
Baker did not get back into the truck because she was "afraid of what might hap-
pen.55 (R. 131:135.) She did not elaborate. (But seeR. 131:170 (Baker reported to the 
officer that she was not physically afraid of Carter; "rather, she was afraid he would drive 
her around instead of taking her to work55).) This went on for several blocks. Baker ig-
nored Carter. (R. 131:132, 136, 141, 149.) She told him to leave her alone. (R. 131:137.) 
Also, Baker testified that she "was ducking behind telephone poles and stuff like 
that, because I thought he was trying to hit me.55 (R. 131:139.) 
Baker testified that at approximately Redwood Road and 13th South, Carter 
pulled over and got out of the truck and walked over to her. He then took her phone 
"because [she] threatened to call the police if he didn't leave [her] alone.55 (R. 131:141.) 
He grabbed the phone from her backpack and pulled her hair as he did so. (R. 131:142.) 
According to Baker, at approximately 10th South Carter stopped following her. (R. 
131:142-43.) 
Baker testified that before the incident of November 30, 2002, Carter had 
"threatened to drive [their other vehicle] into a telephone pole and take [them] both out.55 
(R. 131:144.) On November 30, he said that "one of us was going to get hurt.55 (R. 
131:144.) Baker reported that Carter had never struck or physically harmed her at any 
time. (R. 131:171.) 
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Baker testified that Carter was typically a very aggressive driver. (R. 131:142.) 
She testified that she thought Carter was in control of the truck. "He was able to 
stop when he wanted to.55 (R. 131:136.) She was not aware of any problems with the 
truck's steering or braking, and the accelerator was not sticking. (R. 131:145, 152.) She 
was aware only of the idling problem with the truck. (Id.) She and Carter had recently 
purchased the used truck to drive while the Blazer was not operational. (R. 131:152.) 
The state also called a police officer to testify. She did not witness events between 
Carter and Baker. (R. 131:164.) She testified that she had an anonymous call of a 
possible domestic dispute, and she drove to Redwood Road and discovered Baker 
walking along the road to work. (R. 131:162-65.) The officer's statement about the 
report was not admitted into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted. (R. 131:163.) 
In considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support criminal recklessness, 
the inquiry involves both "objective and subjective elements." Robinson, 2003 UT App 
1, TJ6. The two subjective elements are (1) whether the defendant "actually perceived the 
risk that his or her actions presented" and (2) "whether he or she consciously disregarded 
it." Id In this case, the evidence supports that Carter was aware of problems with the 
truck. Also, he was able to drive the truck in a way to ensure that he had control of the 
truck. (SeeR. 131:136, 137, 138, 190, 192, 195.) 
Utah law imposes a duty upon the driver of a vehicle to exercise ordinary care to 
avoid causing an accident resulting in injury. The driver is required to drive the vehicle 
under control and to be able to stop in order to avoid a collision. See e.g. Horsley v. 
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Robinson. 186 P.2d 592, 597 (Utah 1947) (stating that a driver is required to operate a 
vehicle so that he can stop or turn to avoid an accident); see also Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
80 (1998) (requiring operator of a vehicle to exercise due care to avoid a collision with a 
pedestrian); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46(1) (1998) (requiring operator of a vehicle to drive 
at a reasonable speed that gives regard to pedestrians); Klafta v. Smith, 404 P.2d 659, 661 
(Utah 1965) (ruling that a violation of Utah traffic statute constitutes prima facie evidence 
of negligence). 
Carter had control of the truck and was able to stop to avoid any collision or injury. 
Baker testified that Carter could stop when he wanted and he did stop in sufficient time to 
avoid injuring her. (R. 131:136, 137, 138.) Carter had no problems with the brakes and 
he had control of the steering. (R. 131:136, 137, 138, 196.) 
Where Carter had the truck under control, he had no reason to perceive any risk to 
Baker when he drove up to her several times and stopped behind her. Carter testified he 
was not trying to scare or injure Baker. (R. 131:192-93, 205-06.) He stopped so that he 
could talk to her, and the evidence shows he did not physically harm her. Also, he did not 
know that she considered his conduct to be a threat or risk. (See id.); see also Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 267 (recognizing that for recklessness, defendant knew of the risk created by 
his conduct, and his conscious disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from the 
reasonable standard of care); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3). 
To the extent Carter should have been aware that his conduct created a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk to Baker, he was not actually aware of such risk. That constitutes 
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criminal negligence. Negligence is insufficient to support criminal recklessness. See 
Warden, 813 P.2d at 1151 (for criminal negligence, a defendant may be held liable when 
the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that conduct created a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk, that the defendant should have perceived the risk but failed to do so, 
and "that the risk is of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care"); Howard, 597 P.2d at 881 (ruling that the 
difference between recklessness and criminal negligence is whether defendant "was 
aware, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk," or whether defendant "was 
unaware but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk") (emphasis in original). 
Indeed, even if it can be said that the conduct here constituted mere recklessness, 
that is insufficient to support the crime of endangerment. See Robinson, 2003 UT 1, |^10 
n.3 (stating that "'reckless' in its colloquial sense" will not suffice; "the definition of 
'reckless'that we are bound to follow" "is narrower"). 
Also, while Baker testified that she ran behind "telephone poles and stuff like that, 
because [she] thought he was trying to hit" her (R. 131:139), she did not indicate whether 
she did that when he first drove up and yelled at her, or sometime later. The gap in evi-
dence is significant. If she ran behind poles when she first got out of the truck, or when 
he first pulled up to her and stopped, she may have believed he could not stop the truck. 
However, as the evidence shows, she soon realized that he had control and he was 
able to and did stop to avoid injury or contact as he drove up to talk to her. (R. 131:136, 
137,138.) Baker then ignored Carter. She continued to walk down the road to work. (R. 
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131:135-37.) Carter pulled up to her several times. She did not turn to look at him. (See 
R. 131:136-37.) Carter had no reason to perceive that his conduct was a risk to Baker. 
That explanation of the gap in evidence is consistent with Baker's testimony that 
she heard him use the brakes when he drove up, she knew he could use the brakes, he had 
no problem stopping the car, and she ignored him. (R. 131:133-38, 170.) Also, it is 
consistent with the fact that Carter did not harm her while he was in control of the truck. 
The evidence should undermine this Court's confidence in the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict. See Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, Tf 10. 
Also, while Baker may have perceived Carter's driving to be reckless, her percep-
tion of the events is not evidence of Carter's mental state. It is evidence only of her 
condition. "Liability for criminal recklessness, knowledge, and intent requires actual 
knowledge or awareness, and thus turns on the defendant's subjective mental state." State 
v. Martinez. 2000 UT App 320, |12 n.5, 14 P.3d 114 (cites omitted; emphasis added), 
affd, 2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276. 
Baker perceived cars to be dangerous in general. (See R. 131:129 (she stopped 
driving completely due to a traumatic event).) Baker's mental state may not be imputed 
to Carter. See State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994) (recognizing that a 
defendant's degree of responsibility "is determined by his own mental state" and not the 
mental state of others) (quoting State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983)). While 
Baker considered it reckless to drive up to her on the shoulder of the road to yell, Carter 
had the vehicle under control so as not to collide with anything or injure Baker. He had 
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no reason to know that his conduct created a risk of any injury, let alone a substantial risk 
of death or serious bodily injury here. 
Next, the objective component of criminal recklessness considers the magnitude of 
the risk. See Robinson, 2003 UT App 1,1J6. For the crime here, the magnitude of the risk 
must be substantial: there must be a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. 
"Serious bodily injury" is injury that "creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (2003). 
According to the evidence, after Baker got out of the truck on Redwood Road, she 
was afraid, she ran behind "telephone poles and stuff like that," she believed Carter may 
"clip" her with the truck, she heard gravel and dirt fly, and she tried to ignore Carter. (R. 
131: 135-139.) The officer testified that Baker reported to her after the fact that she was 
not afraid that Carter would physically harm her, but that he would drive her around 
rather than to work. (R. 131:170.) 
While evidence that a person is afraid and feels sufficiently threatened to hide 
behind poles would suggest a substantial fear, that is not enough. The statute for endan-
germent requires evidence of substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-112. On that point, the evidence is insufficient. It is also ambiguous. To 
give context to the evidence, the record here supports that Baker was not in danger. She 
knew Carter could and did stop the truck when he needed to, and he stopped to avoid 
contact. (R. 131:135-138.) While Baker thought Carter might "clip" her if he did not 
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stop (R. 131:137), that is not enough to support the "magnitude of risk" for reckless 
endangerment. See Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, Tf6 (stating that the objective component 
of criminal recklessness considers the magnitude of the risk involved); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (requiring the magnitude of risk to be substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury). A fear of clipping does not give rise to risk of death or serious 
bodily injury. .See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (defining "serious bodily injury"). 
Also, as set forth above (supra, pages 20-21), if Baker ran behind telephone poles 
when Carter first drove up to her with the truck, she soon realized that he could and did 
stop each time he pulled up. She knew he had control of the truck. That evidence fails to 
support criminal recklessness; it undermines any risk, without more, to Baker. Any 
alternative interpretation is remote and speculative. 
Under the law, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. See Brown, 948 
P.2d at 344; see also Shumwav, 2002 UT 124, If 15 (stating the court may not take 
speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence); Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ]fl0. 
Finally, the crime of criminal recklessness punishes physical conduct. It prohibits 
"conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-112(1). The jury here may have been swayed by the fact that Carter was angry 
that day, that he screamed and yelled at Baker, that he pulled her hair when he took her 
phone from her, and that he had made threats. (R. 131:130-31, 135, 142, 144, 150.) 
Yet, the verbal assaults did not create risk of death or injury. In addition, the fact 
that Carter pulled Baker's hair when he took the phone does not support criminal 
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recklessness that would create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Pulling 
hair does not rise to the level of risk of death, or of permanent disfigurement or 
protracted loss/impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (defining "serious bodily injury"). 
In the end, the evidence shows that Carter was irritated that day. He did not want 
to drive Baker to work. Also, he was angry when he discovered problems with the truck. 
He pulled over. He called Baker names and was belligerent. He told her to get out. 
Baker began walking down the road, and Carter drove up to her several times to yell and 
scream at her. He had control of the truck. He could steer and stop as he wanted. He 
stopped each time he pulled up abruptly behind or beside Baker. This caused the truck to 
skid and throw gravel and dirt. Baker ignored Carter. Carter's conduct did not physically 
harm Baker, and it did not cause substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Carter 
did not perceive his conduct to be a risk to Baker. To the extent Carter should have been 
aware of a substantial risk to Carter, he was not. That supports only negligence. The 
evidence fails to support criminal recklessness. The conviction must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Carter requests that this Court vacate the conviction for insufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this^fdav of Q(yCl\M^^ , 2004. 
LINDA M. JONES 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
WILLIAM DONALD CARTER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031900667 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: July 12, 2 004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: PARKINSON, PATRICIA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): O'CONNELL, JOHN D JR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 2, 1972 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 104842 
CHARGES 
1. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/27/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 120 day(s) 
in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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Case No: 031900667 
Date: Jul 12, 2 004 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $400.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION 
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 120 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by July 19, 2004 by 9 a.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
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Date: Jul 12, 2 004 
COMPLY WITH ALL A/D CLAUSES PER AP&P, NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM, 
COMPLETE EVALUATION/TREATMENT PER AP&P AND ANY AFTERCARE PROGRAM, 
PRESCRIBED MEDICATION TAKE AS ORDER BY DOCTOR 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
76-5-112. Reckless endangerment — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. 
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor. 
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1 brief recess, we've only been going a few moments, so the jury 
2 will recess for just five minutes* And then we will come back 
3 in. 
4 THE BAILIFF: Please rise for the jury* 
5 THE COURT: Thank you* 
6 All right. The jury has left the courtroom. Go 
7 ahead and be seated. And I talk over my clerks every time 
8 they say to be seated, so you can stay standing the rest of 
9 the trial, if we're doing it. 
10 That was a very brief time before—between recesses, 
11 but I think it does come to a natural breaking point so that 
12 either party can have the benefit of the record before we 
13 proceed with this. 
14 Mr. O'Connell? 
15 MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, since the State's 
16 rested, at this time, I would make a motion to dismiss. I 
17 think even taking the State's case, you know, which of course, 
18 you have to, in the light most favorable to the State and all 
19 their evidence, we have a situation here where an individual 
20 can drive his car, even upset and comes to rather quickly and 
21 stops, but doesn't strike her, or I guess you could say she 
22 does—he at least comes close to her. 
23 I don't think this rises to the level, is enough 
24 for—to submit to the jury that this is reckless. And again, 
25 it's because it's such a high standard, you may say there was, 
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you know, improper, incorrect, bad driving, dangerous, and— 
but I don't think it—it may be negligent, may even be 
criminally negligent, but I don't think it rises to the level 
of—of the negligence standard in this particular case. 
Just so you're aware, typically negligence— 
recklessness, excuse me, is—usually goes in part and parcel 
with intentional knowing and recklessly; most crimes are 
considered one of those three standards, so it's a pretty high 
standard* It gets up there with intentional and knowingly and 
even with the facts that weigh in support of the State's case, 
I don't think rises to that level. 
MR. POSTMA: I disagree with the general 
characterization of recklessness. I think it is a much 
different standard from intentionally and knowingly. Those 
are the two terms that are most frequently paired together, or 
intentionally and knowingly. Recklessly, I—I think the State 
has certainly met its burden in this case on reckless. To 
drive a seven-thousand pound automobile repeatedly within 
inches of the victim shows reckless conduct. Anyone who has 
driven a car, anyone who has a driver's license, knows that 
automobiles kill and to drive an automobile in this fashion 
shows that the defendant is consciously disregarding the risk 
of death by running over the victim, or serious bodily injury 
if he were to hit the victim in this case. 
Perhaps if this had happened once, it could be 
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1 termed an accident or negligent conduct, but to do this 
2 repeatedly, your Honor, I think shows recklessness in this 
3 case. 
4 THE COURT: All right- Thank you. 
5 I Anything further, Mr- O'Connell? 
6 MR. O'CONNELL: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. I have been taking notes of 
8 the testimony as well, so that I can review them and make sure 
9 that I am relying on the evidence that has been presented here 
10 in making this ruling. 
11 I am going to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss 
12 at this time. While the standard is higher at this point, I 
13 do believe that the State has presented testimony through Ms. 
14 Baker's testimony that the defendant did pull the car very 
15 close to her, two—at least two to three times, which is what 
16 my notes say that she did, and that at the time that he was 
17 doing this, he was yelling at her, he was angry, he was 
18 agitated, were the words that were presented, as well as 
19 making threats that one of them was going to get hurt. 
20 And then evidence has also been presented that the 
21 phone was taken from her in a threatening manner. All of this 
22 taken together, I think is sufficient evidence for a trier of 
23 fact to find that the behavior was more than bad driving, more 
24 than even just negligent behavior. That, given the fact that 
25 we are dealing with the powerful tool of a motor vehicle and 
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that the victim was outside of the vehicle, so we're talking 
about a motor vehicle versus a person, that there is certainly 
a very real danger of serious injury or even death in this 
kind of circumstances. 
And for it to be repeated, as argued by the State 
and accompanied by threatening language and angry behavior, a 
trier of fact could reasonably find that that grossly deviated 
from the normal—from the norm, and that it was beyond 
negligent behavior and could find that it was reckless 
pursuant to the legal definition of reckless. 
So, the motion to dismiss at this time is granted— 
is dis—denied. I do find there is sufficient testimony to go 
to the jury and the trier of fact. 
How does the defense wish to proceed, now that the 
State has rested? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, if I could just have a 
moment? 
THE COURT: Uh huh, you may. And if you need to 
have it outside of the Court, that's always available. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Okay. I—we do intend to call the 
defendant, so... 
THE COURT: All right. Then, do you need a recess 
or do you want to bring in and then have a little bit 
lengthier recess before— 
MR. O'CONNELL: I—we're ready to go right now. 
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